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Paving the Way for U.S. Climate Leadership: The Case for 
Executive Agreements and Climate Protection Authority 
Nigel Purvis 
Abstract 
The United States should classify new international agreements to protect the Earth’s climate 
system as executive agreements rather than as treaties. Unlike treaties, which require the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate, executive agreements are entered into either solely by the President 
based on previously delegated constitutional, treaty, or statutory authorities, or by the President and 
Congress together pursuant to a new statute. The President and Congress should handle the most 
significant climate change agreements as congressional–executive agreements, which require approval by 
a simple majority of both houses of Congress. Handling climate agreements as congressional–executive 
agreements would speed the development of a genuinely bipartisan U.S. climate change foreign policy, 
improve coordination between the executive and legislative branches, strengthen the hand of U.S. climate 
negotiators to bring home good agreements, increase the prospects for U.S. participation in those 
agreements, protect U.S. competitiveness, and spur international climate action. More specifically, 
Congress should enact “Climate Protection Authority,” which would define U.S. negotiating objectives in 
a statute and require the President to submit concluded congressional–executive agreements to Congress 
for final approval. This approach should apply both to the new global climate change agreement being 
negotiated in the United Nations by the United States and the rest of the international community and to 
other future arrangements with a smaller number of major emitting nations.  
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Paving the Way for U.S. Climate Leadership: The Case for 
Executive Agreements and Climate Protection Authority 
Nigel Purvis∗ 
Introduction 
The United States should classify new international agreements to protect the Earth’s 
climate system as executive agreements rather than as treaties. Unlike treaties, which require the 
advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, executive agreements are entered into either 
solely by the President based on previously delegated constitutional, treaty, or statutory 
authorities, or by the President and Congress together pursuant to a new statute. Although limits 
exist on the types of climate agreements the President could enter into without the approval of 
Congress, the President’s authorities are broader than many policymakers realize and could be 
relied on if Congress fails to craft a strong bipartisan policy.  
The President and Congress should handle the most significant climate change 
agreements—ones that would limit U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, change the terms of 
international trade, or impose substantial costs on the U.S. economy or treasury—as 
congressional–executive agreements, which require approval by a simple majority of both houses 
of Congress. Handling climate agreements as congressional–executive agreements would speed 
the development of a genuinely bipartisan U.S. climate change foreign policy, improve 
coordination between the executive and legislative branches, strengthen the hand of U.S. climate 
negotiators to bring home good agreements, increase the prospects for U.S. participation in those 
agreements, protect U.S. competitiveness, and spur international climate action. 
As a matter of U.S. law, virtually any international agreement the United States rightfully 
could join as a treaty it could implement as a congressional–executive agreement. 
Congressional–executive agreements are far from novel; they are, by far, the most common form 
of international agreement entered into by the United States. Congressional–executive 
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agreements are used by the President and Congress to tackle dozens and dozens of important 
global issues and, in both legal and policy terms, they are ideally suited for the climate problem.  
More specifically, Congress should enact “Climate Protection Authority,” which would 
define U.S. negotiating objectives in a statute and require the President to submit concluded 
congressional–executive agreements to Congress for final approval. (See Box 1 below for a 
preview of how Climate Protection Authority might work.) This approach should apply both to 
the new global climate change agreement being negotiated in the United Nations by the United 
States and the rest of the international community and to other future arrangements with a 
smaller number of major emitting nations.  
This paper has six sections. The first section gives some needed policy context by 
reviewing past, present, and future U.S. climate foreign policy. The second section explains U.S. 
options for authorizing, concluding, and approving international agreements generally. The third 
section examines situations in which the President and Congress may turn to executive 
agreements as substitutes for treaties and describes past U.S. practice in this regard. The fourth 
section applies these general legal principles to climate change and evaluates the usefulness of 
executive agreements to the climate issue. The fifth section makes the case for creating, by 
statute, Climate Protection Authority as a new procedural   mechanism for defining and 
implementing U.S. climate foreign policy. And the final section explains why this approach 
would further the interests of key stakeholders. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
3 
Box 1: Climate Protection Authority—A Preview  
How it might work in practice 
Jan. 2009:  The President makes climate change a top priority for the United States. The President and 
Congress consult on the objectives and strategies for U.S. climate foreign policy, including 
the importance of immediately enacting strong domestic legislation and the benefits of 
negotiating new international climate change executive agreements rather than treaties. 
 
June 2009: Congress approves, and the President signs into law, legislation that sets an environmentally 
appropriate and economically feasible mandatory U.S. emissions target that is determined 
nationally, not negotiated internationally. The statute requires U.S. emissions to be X percent 
below today’s levels by 2020 without international preconditions. As part of this legislation, 
Congress also approves “Climate Protection Authority,” which (i) authorizes the President to 
negotiate new climate change executive agreements, (ii) defines U.S. negotiating objectives 
or principles, (iii) creates mechanisms for improving coordination between both branches 
during the negotiations, (iv) directs the President to submit concluded agreements to both 
houses of Congress for approval by a simple majority of each body, and (v) provides for 
simplified congressional review of  these agreements, such as a straight up-or-down vote in 
both houses of Congress within 90 legislative days, without conditions, holds, filibusters, or 
amendments. The Climate Protection Authority statute envisions strengthening the U.S. 
emissions target by an additional Y percent below 2020 levels if Congress determines that 
the world’s other major emitters have made equitable and nationally appropriate climate 
commitments. 
 
Dec. 2010: In close consultation with Congress, and pursuant to the terms of Climate Protection 
Authority, the President negotiates, concludes, and submits to Congress for its approval a 
new global climate change agreement. By its own terms, the agreement shall not enter into 
force unless all five of the world’s largest emitters ratify the agreement, along with countries 
representing two-thirds of global emissions. 
 
Mar. 2011: Congress, in accordance with statutory procedures, approves the new climate agreement 
along with implementing legislation needed to allow both the agreement and the new, more 
stringent, U.S. emissions target to go into effect under domestic law once the agreement 
enters into force. 
 
Apr. 2011: The President signs the implementing legislation into law and completes formalities needed 
to make the United States a party to the new agreement once it enters into force. 
 
Dec. 2012: The new agreement and the more stringent U.S. target enter into force when the last of the 
world’s major emitters joins the agreement and enough other nations have ratified the deal. 
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I. The Climate Policy Context 
A. New Challenges and Opportunities 
The scientific evidence is now overwhelming: climate change is a serious global threat 
that demands forceful U.S. leadership and a strong international response. The adverse impacts 
of climate change at home and abroad will harm our economy, threaten our security, and imperil 
our communities and ecosystems.  
U.S. policymakers now have two major opportunities to tackle the climate challenge. In 
December 2007, the United States and the rest of the international community agreed to a 
roadmap for negotiating a new U.N. climate treaty by December 2009. The controversial 1997 
Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012 and new arrangements are urgently needed. This new 
round of climate talks provides a real chance for all nations to ensure strong, equitable action by 
major greenhouse gas–emitting countries—including the United States, China, and India—which 
have, in the past, resisted obligations to mitigate their emissions. The U.S. Congress, moreover, 
is actively considering an ever-growing number of credible bipartisan legislative proposals that 
would substantially reduce U.S. emissions over the next few decades. Regardless of who wins 
the presidential election in 2008, the United States seems likely to enact mandatory domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions limits.  
Aligning these domestic and international efforts will be key to success in managing 
climate change. New domestic laws must help spur international cooperation, and new 
international agreements must mesh with domestic emissions reduction strategies. We cannot 
solve the climate challenge alone, nor can we allow the international community to dictate U.S. 
policy. To engage other nations effectively, the United States must pursue the following goals:  
  
1.  Take domestic action to reduce our own emissions and thereby move the U.S. economy 
in the right direction, demonstrate our seriousness to the international community, and 
bolster U.S. credibility. 
 
2.  Articulate a credible and comprehensive vision of international climate cooperation for 
the next few decades, including the concrete mechanisms, institutions, and resources 
needed to get the job done.  
 
3.  Set forth clear and realistic negotiating objectives that not only advance our own national 
interests, but also take into account those of other countries.  
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4.  Convince other nations that if they work with the United States to advance a common 
vision, the United States will follow through by joining and implementing new 
international agreements that embody the approach.  
To achieve these goals cooperation between the President and Congress is essential 
because climate change affects the constitutional authorities of both political branches of 
government. Although the President leads our diplomatic efforts, Congress initiates legislation to 
strengthen our economy, manage government spending, and protect our general welfare. Climate 
change is a global problem that requires international solutions, but climate solutions will affect 
nearly every aspect of our domestic society because emissions are byproducts of almost every 
part of our economy and culture. In short, climate change is both a domestic and an international 
issue with relevance for the environment, economy, international development, and security. So 
far the President and the Congress have not found common ground on climate change. In the 
1990s, the Republican Congress did not support the Clinton administration’s approach as 
reflected in the Kyoto Protocol; more recently, the Democratic Congress has not supported the 
Bush administration’s rejection of binding national emissions targets.  
Enhancing the role of Congress in setting climate foreign policy will help the next 
President engage other nations effectively. With more active involvement, Congress would gain 
new appreciation for the complex diplomatic realities inherent in climate negotiations. 
Legislators would be inclined to take an ownership interest in America’s success and, therefore, 
would be more likely to champion good, but imperfect, agreements that represent the best deals 
that could be reached under difficult circumstances. Congress is unlikely to accept an 
international consensus that it did not help design and shape—as evidenced by widespread 
hostility toward the Kyoto Protocol in the 1990s—and the President will be less likely to ignore 
Congress if the latter is engaged and offering constructive solutions. 
Regrettably, the United States has met none of the conditions for success in climate 
diplomacy. We have neither a clear bipartisan vision regarding the ideal shape of future 
international climate cooperation, nor a sound bipartisan strategy for working with other nations 
in a multilateral negotiating process. We even lack bipartisan negotiating objectives for the 
international climate negotiations that are already underway. President Bush and the Democratic 
Congress have radically different views about the optimal strategies. We also lack a Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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comprehensive plan for using future domestic climate laws, such as proposed “cap-and-trade”1 
systems, to engage other nations. Moreover, policymakers feel torn by the substantive imperative 
to encourage global action and the perceived political liability of proposing any specific new 
U.N. climate deal, which would probably involve assistance to China and other rapidly growing 
developing nations to help their economies grow more cleanly.  
B. On the Wrong Path 
Disagreement and uncertainty within the U.S. government about both the international 
dimensions of Federal climate legislation and the framework for U.S. climate diplomacy creates 
three very serious risks. First, absent a clear, workable, and broadly supported American climate 
foreign policy, U.S. negotiators are unlikely to craft a climate agreement that is both politically 
realistic and effective. Instead, we may end up with another U.N. treaty that America cannot join 
because it is perceived to be too costly or to require insufficient action by others. Other nations 
may have little confidence that we will participate in climate agreements and may, therefore, 
resist making needed concessions. Alternatively, we might negotiate an agreement that we could 
join but that would not do enough globally to solve the climate crisis quickly. Either way, the 
consequences could be catastrophic. 
Second, the next President’s climate change foreign policy may divide the country 
because too few policymakers and opinion leaders appreciate the trade-offs the United States 
must make in highly complex and contentious global climate negotiations. A politicized climate 
foreign policy, in turn, could become a major impediment to domestic climate action just as 
disagreements over the Kyoto Protocol crowded out serious consideration of less controversial 
policies. 
Third, Congress may fail to design domestic climate legislation with the international 
community firmly in mind. Without a clear vision of our international goals, domestic legislation 
is unlikely to engage other nations as much as it should. A go-it-alone approach in the United 
                                                 
1 Federal cap-and-trade legislation would set a mandatory national target, or cap, and allow major polluters to 
comply with their emissions obligations by acquiring rights to tradable emissions permits issued by the government, 
affording companies the flexibility to buy and sell permits, thereby helping to ensure cost-effective action. The 
United States uses this approach quite successfully under the Clean Air Act to reduce the emissions that cause acid 
rain. Europe has adopted a cap-and-trade system to regulate a major portion of its climate emissions under the 
European Emissions Trading System. Most climate policymakers expect that, when the United States does set a 
mandatory national emissions limit, it will rely on cap-and-trade legislation to help meet that target. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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States would have us forgo important opportunities provided by our own domestic climate laws 
to entice and cajole other nations to act responsibly. For example, U.S. cap-and-trade legislation 
may not create the carrots and sticks needed to move China and India toward more climate-
friendly growth. Our domestic laws must contribute to a workable global solution.  
Our past policy failures and the urgency of the problem argue for a fresh approach. Many 
of our national politicians and policymakers have radically different views about the most 
appropriate role for the Federal government in solving the climate problem. The approaches 
debated by policy makers include mandatory emission limits (in a cap-and-trade program), 
voluntary targets and standards, an Apollo Project-scale increase in government funding for 
clean energy research and development, a “clean energy Marshall Plan” program to help 
developing nations grow more cleanly, carbon taxes, border taxes on imports from nations that 
are not mitigating their emissions, reduced subsidies for fossil fuel industries, elimination of 
trade barriers for clean energy products. Our national political leaders will have to find common 
ground to craft a strong and enduring climate change foreign policy.  
Because reaching a consensus on these substantive policy issues will be challenging, we 
must ensure that we are approaching the task in the most constructive way. In other words, we 
must have in place procedural mechanisms that make the back-and-forth on policy options as 
conducive to reaching consensus as possible. We must not cling to preconceived notions of how 
our country negotiates and reviews international climate agreements. Rather, we must look for 
inspiration from other, more successful, areas of American foreign policy.  
II. Treaties and Other International Agreements 
In this section, I examine U.S. foreign relations law and practice to explain the procedural 
options for entering into new climate change agreements. In particular, I distinguish between 
treaties and other types of international agreements, including executive agreements. I place 
special emphasis on executive agreements that receive the formal approval of Congress.  
A. International Agreements 
Under both international and U.S. law, an international agreement is an arrangement 
“between two or more states or international organizations that is intended to be legally binding Resources for the Future  Purvis 
8 
and is governed by international law.”2  Sometimes the international community describes an 
international agreement simply as an agreement, but the words treaty, charter, covenant, 
protocol, convention, accords, and a number of other appellations are also common. As a matter 
of international law, the name makes no difference—all can create international law obligations 
for state parties.3  Sometimes nations use similarly arcane terms to describe international 
arrangements that are not intended to be legally binding under international law. For example, 
declarations, final acts of conferences, communiqués, and joint statements generally are not 
considered international agreements but they can be.4  It is the intention of the parties that 
counts.5   
Although international agreements are, by definition, legally binding on state parties, they 
may nevertheless contain a mix of enforceable and unenforceable, or voluntary and legally 
binding commitments. Some international agreements contain nonbinding promises along with 
binding commitments. Similarly, some legally binding commitments in international agreements 
are not enforceable (e.g., the agreements fail to provide recourse for noncompliance).  
As a matter of international law, most international agreements come into force for each 
state party only after domestic review and approval. Some agreements, however, enter into force 
immediately, when concluded or signed, because they require no further domestic process. 
Multilateral agreements—those involving many nations—often condition entry into force on 
domestic approval by some minimum number of nations. When domestic approval is required, 
each nation may carry out its review process in accordance with its own domestic laws. By 
signing such an agreement, a nation merely acknowledges that a given text correctly expresses 
the proposed agreement and that the signing country intends to seek domestic approval to join 
the agreement.6  Internationally, a country is bound by an international agreement only after it 
has completed its domestic approval process and, when provided for by the agreement, has 
finished certain international formalities that indicate to other nations that it intends to be bound 
                                                 
2 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of The Unites States, Section 202 (1987) [hereinafter 
“Restatement (Third)”]. See Congressional Research Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements: the 
Role of the United States Senate, S. Prt. 106–71, at 1, (2001) [hereinafter “CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements”].   
3 Restatement (Third), Section 301, Comment a, at 149. 
4 Id., Section 301, Reporters’ Note 1, at 151. 
5 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 4. 
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18; Restatement (Third), Section 312; Digest of International 
Law, Vol. 14 (1968), at 40.  Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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by the agreement (e.g., by depositing formal instruments of ratification with an international 
body, such as the United Nations). Beyond this, a country is bound only once the international 
agreement has entered into force pursuant to its own terms, such as by obtaining a minimum 
number of state parties.  
U.S. domestic law provides two distinct ways for the United States to become a party to 
an international agreement and thereby bind itself with respect to other parties: treaties and 
executive agreements. Under international law, these two types of instruments are 
indistinguishable7 in that both can create binding international obligations. Even under U.S. law, 
once approved and in force, both treaties and executive agreements are equivalent to federal 
statutes;8 either type of agreement becomes the “supreme law of the land” until changed by a 
later conflicting Federal statute or a Constitutional amendment.9  Very importantly, however, the 
domestic processes the United States uses to negotiate, review, and approve treaties and 
executive agreements are quite different. Herein rests a common source of confusion. The United 
States may deem an international agreement an “executive agreement” for purposes of its 
domestic review, even though the international community may decide to call the pact a “treaty.”  
Similarly, the United States may determine that an international agreement is a treaty, whereas 
the rest of the world might call it an agreement, protocol, convention, or something else entirely.  
B. U.S. Treaty Practice  
The U.S. Constitution sets forth the formalities the United States must follow to approve 
international agreements that are deemed treaties under domestic law. The Constitution states 
that the President “shall have Power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make 
treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”10  Under U.S. law, most treaties do 
not become binding as a matter of domestic law unless and until Congress enacts a statute that 
gives the treaty domestic effect, usually referred to as “implementing legislation.”  Treaties of 
this type are said to be non-self-executing; once they enter into force, they create international 
legal obligations for the United States without changing U.S. domestic law. True compliance 
with such treaties may depend on the degree to which the domestic implementing legislation 
                                                 
7 Restatement (Third), Part III, Introductory Notes, at 144–146; CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 4.  
8 Restatement (Third), Section 303. 
9 Restatement (Third), Section 115. See U.S. Constitution, Article VI. 
10 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.  Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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faithfully mirrors the obligations of the treaty. It is the longstanding practice of the Executive 
Branch not to take the final steps necessary to bind the United States internationally to treaties 
duly approved by the Senate unless both houses of Congress have approved needed 
implementing legislation.11  The 1989 Basel Convention, which regulates the transboundary 
movement and disposal of hazardous waste, received the advice and consent of the Senate but 
the United States is not yet a party to the Convention because Congress has not approved needed 
implementing legislation. A diagram of the path the United States takes to enter into a treaty is 
provided at Appendix 1.  
Securing the consent of two-thirds of the Senate to a treaty, along with the consent of 
both houses of Congress for implementing legislation, is a daunting task. By design, the 
Constitution’s supermajority requirement for treaties—among the highest bars imposed by the 
Constitution—allows ideological or regional minority interests in the Senate to frustrate the will 
of the majority. The treaty clause has never worked as the framers of the Constitution intended. 
First, the framers expected international agreements to be relatively rare. That assumption, of 
course, has been wrong for more than a century and today it is entirely out of step with reality. 
International agreements are essential tools through which our nation advances its national 
interests in a heavily interconnected and rapidly globalizing world. Second, the framers imagined 
that the Senate, which had only 26 members at its inception, would remain small and nimble 
enough to serve as active counselors to the President throughout the negotiating process. Even at 
the start of the republic, the Senate did not live up to the framers’ expectations in this regard.12  
From George Washington on, Presidents have considered the Senate too large and diverse to 
provide useful, timely, and confidential advice. Today, the 100-member Senate is almost double 
the original size of the House of Representatives, which the framers considered too big to advise 
the President on treaties. In practice, the Senate’s “advice and consent” has been reduced to just 
“consent.”13   
                                                 
11 R. Dalton, National Treaty Law and Practice: United States, in National Treaty Law and Practice 11 (M. Lee et 
al. eds., 1999). 
12 B. Ackerman and D. Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799, 807–813 (1995), O. Hathaway, 
Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Law Making in the United States, 118 Yale L. J. 103, 
144 (forthcoming summer 2008) [hereinafter “O. Hathaway, Treaties’ End”]. 
13 L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution (2d ed.), at 177 (paraphrase). See also CRS, Treaties and 
Other Agreements, at 2. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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Third, the Senate’s treaty practice has evolved in ways that the framers could not have 
anticipated. The Senate typically takes up treaties only after they have been approved by its 
Committee on Foreign Relations. As a general rule, that committee will not act on a treaty if a 
minority of the committee objects and demands further time to consider the matter, resulting in 
an informal committee “hold.”  The objection of a single Senator has prevented some treaties 
from ever being voted on by the committee (let alone the full Senate); in some cases, this has left 
treaties in limbo for many decades.14  Although the Senate has only rejected seven treaties in the 
past century, 45 treaties currently languish in the Senate, some of these dating back to the 
1940s.15  Several of these agreements have been joined by practically every major democracy in 
the world except the United States.16 
The Senate’s recent experience with the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
illustrates the challenge of moving a treaty through that body. Negotiations to update the 
international law of the sea began in 1973 and were concluded in 1982. When the United States 
objected to the deep sea mining provisions of the original agreement, the international 
community agreed to modify those provisions to accommodate the United States and secure its 
participation in the treaty. Certain modifications were proposed by the first Bush administration 
and were secured in 1994 by the Clinton administration, which then submitted the treaty to the 
Senate for its advice and consent. The revised agreement has received broad, enthusiastic 
support, from President George W. Bush, the U.S. military, our national security community, 
major corporations, and leading environmental groups. Nevertheless, a very small but vocal 
minority in the Senate has, until very recently, blocked consideration of the agreement by the full 
Senate for more than a decade.17  The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that the United States’ 
failure to ratify the treaty creates significant security risks for our country, partly because other 
nations use our nonparty status to inhibit the safe passage of U.S. Navy vessels and the United 
States is not represented in various international lawmaking bodies.  
                                                 
14 See, e.g. International Labor Organization Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize (1949). See also O. Hathaway, Treaties’ End, at 172–181 and S. Charnowitz, Using Framework 
Statutes to Facilitate U.S. Treaty Making, 98 Amer. J. Int’l L. 696,  698 (2004).  
15 U.S. Department of State, Treaties Pending in the Senate (Rev. December 7, 2007). 
16 See, e.g. the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on 
International Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; and the 
Convention on Biodiversity.  
17 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved the Convention on the Law of the Sea in October 2007, 
the first time it was able to take up the modified accord. The agreement now lies before the full Senate. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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As Yale Law Professor Oona Hathaway has demonstrated, the manner in which the 
United States approves treaties is very unusual.18  The vast majority of other countries approve 
international agreements in the same way they approve domestic statutes. Other than the United 
States, only 23 countries have a different voting process for domestic and international law. Of 
these, only seven nations provide for some level of automatic incorporation of international 
commitments into domestic law, as does the United States for self-executing agreements. Among 
these, only three countries other than the United States (Ethiopia, Philippines, and Tajikistan) 
provide for less involvement by a part of the legislature in the treaty approval process than they 
require for enacting domestic statutes. Only three countries other than the United States 
(Ecuador, Serbia, and the Slovak Republic) impose higher voting standards for treaties than for 
domestic legislation. The United States is the only nation in the world that does all of this: we 
allow for full and automatic incorporation of international commitments into domestic law, 
disenfranchise part of our legislature in the treaty-making process, and require approval by a 
supermajority of the part of the legislature that does have a say.19 
America’s unique approach to treaty approval has very real consequences. The difficulty 
inherent in moving treaties through the Senate has increased the incentive for Presidents to find 
alternatives to the treaty process, often keeping Congress in the dark and farther removed than 
the framers of the Constitution intended. The Senate’s treaty practice also has discouraged 
Presidents from negotiating good agreements that would be unlikely to secure the support of 
two-thirds of the Senate. The treaty practice has harmed the credibility of the United States: in 
the eyes of the world, we are an unreliable treaty partner. More frequently than any other major 
power, we insist on major concessions during the negotiating process but then do not join the 
final agreements. Finally, our treaty practice limits the effectiveness of the international system. 
The United States is often an indispensable party. As the whole point of negotiating international 
agreements is to bind countries, particularly indispensable ones, our trouble joining international 
agreements undermines their usefulness as a means of regulating international action and this, in 
turn, harms the entire world.  
 
                                                 
18 O. Hathaway, Treaties’ End, at 137–140. All of the empirical data in this paragraph come from Prof. Hathaway’s 
recent and exhaustive study.  
19 O. Hathaway, Treaties’ End, at 138.  Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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C. Executive Agreements 
In contrast to treaties, executive agreements lack explicit constitutional formality and 
authority. In fact, the Constitution does not mention them as such, and Congress has never 
passed a general statute that authorizes the President to negotiate them.20  Nevertheless, the 
constitutionality of three different types of executive agreements is very well established, 
including by our courts.21  Congress authorized the first executive agreements in 1792.22  They 
grew popular in the 1930s and 40s and, since World War II, the United States has approved over 
90 percent of its international agreements as executive agreements rather than as treaties.23  The 
number of executive agreements, moreover, is growing more rapidly than the number of 
treaties.24  Over its history, the United States has become a party to roughly 15,000 executive 
agreements.25  The steps followed by the United States to enter into executive agreements are 
diagramed in Appendix 2.  
Executive agreements come in three constitutionally permissible forms. 
Sole executive agreements, sometimes called presidential–executive agreements, are 
negotiated, concluded, and approved without the explicit authorization of Congress. Sole 
executive agreements are not uncommon but they represent a small minority of executive 
agreements.26  Whether this is because Presidents believe they may only bind the United States 
without the consent of Congress under limited circumstances or because Presidents generally 
seek the consent of the Senate or Congress for political reasons is somewhat unclear. Presidents 
derive authority to enter into sole executive agreements from numerous provisions of the 
Constitution, ranging from those dealing with the general executive authority of the office and its 
                                                 
20 The only time the Constitution references international agreements other than treaties is when it prohibits U.S. 
states from “entering into any treaty, alliance or confederation” while simultaneously requiring that they obtain the 
consent of Congress before entering into “any agreement or compact with . . . a foreign power.” U.S. Constitution, 
Article I, Section 10. 
21 Restatement (Third), Section 303; CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 4–5. 
22 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 38. 
23 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 39. See also O. Hathaway, Statement before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Operations, Human Rights and Oversight, at n.6, February 8, 2008. 
24 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 39.  
25 U.S. Department of State, Treaty Database (2008). 
26 Between 1946 and 1972, one study reports, 5.5% of U.S. international agreements were sole executive 
agreements. CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 41, note 48. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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obligation to faithfully execute Federal statutes27 to the President’s foreign affairs powers as 
general executive, commander-in-chief, receiver of ambassadors,  implementing authority for 
treaties, and representative of the nation in foreign relations (taken together, the “foreign affairs 
powers”).28  The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “our cases have recognized that the 
President has the authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no 
ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the 
early years of the Republic.”29  Examples of sole executive agreements include the Yalta 
Agreement of 1945, the Vietnam Peace Agreement of 1973, and the Iran Hostage Agreement of 
1981. 
Treaty–executive agreements are explicitly or implicitly authorized by a treaty previously 
ratified by the United States with the advice and consent of at least two-thirds of the Senate. Like 
sole executive agreements, treaty–executive agreements require no further action by Congress to 
enter into force, the Senate having already given its explicit or implied blessing when it approved 
the parent treaty.30  Treaty–executive agreements are somewhat rare. Only about 6 percent of the 
international agreements the United States has joined since World War II have been treaties 
receiving the advice and consent of the Senate.31  Very few of these treaties authorize the 
President to negotiate executive agreements that do not require further congressional review. In 
the exceptional cases where treaties do delegate negotiating authority to the President, many 
times that authority is implied in the text rather than explicitly stated. Examples of treaty–
executive agreements include subsidiary arrangements under the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Panama Canal Treaty, and various subordinate 
agreements governing the status of U.S. military forces stationed abroad.32  Although the 
                                                 
27 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3. 
28 Id., Article II, Sections 1, 2 (Clauses 1 and 2) and 3. 
29 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamedni, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The case upheld a presidential–executive agreement with 
Germany settling U.S. Holocaust-era claims and preempting state restitution laws. Even the dissenting opinion, 
written by Justice Ginsburg, recognizes the constitutionality of sole executive agreements. 
30 Restatement (Third), Section 303, Comment f (equating treaty–executive agreements with treaties); Circular 175, 
at Section 721.2b(1) (basing executive’s authority to conclude an international agreement pursuant to treaty on prior 
consent by Senate). See also Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 528–529 (1957) (holding that Senate approval of a 
security treaty with Japan authorized subsequent treaty–executive agreement regarding criminal offenses). 
31 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 39. See also O. Hathaway, Statement before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organization, Human Rights and Oversight, February 8, 2008, at 2, 
n.6, citing 1984 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report.  
32 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 5; Restatement (Third), Section 303, Reporters’ Note 6. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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constitutional authority of the President to conclude executive agreements pursuant to treaty is 
uncontested, controversy occasionally arises about whether particular agreements indeed were 
authorized by the Senate.33 
Congressional–executive agreements, by far the most common form of executive 
agreements, are concluded by the President and explicitly authorized by Congress by enacting a 
statute. Although some members of the Senate and a very few legal scholars34 still believe that 
many congressional–executive agreements are unconstitutional, this view is not supported by 
U.S. practice, case law, or the weight of scholarly opinion. These agreements are now used by 
the United States in “virtually every area of international law,”35 and represent 85–90 percent of 
all international agreements today.36  Since 1980, the United States has concluded roughly 300 
congressional–executive agreements each year in over 100 different subject areas,37  ranging 
from nuclear cooperation and arms control to space exploration, trade, and international 
fisheries.  
Congress and the President use three distinct approaches for securing congressional 
approval. These approaches have evolved organically without an explicit Constitutional basis, 
influenced by political expediency and changing attitudes toward the Senate’s role in the treaty 
process.  
Ex Ante. In some instances, Congress authorizes and approves an agreement before the 
agreement has been concluded, often doing so before negotiations have even begun. Sometimes 
Congress has granted the President ex ante authority to conclude a large number of similar 
agreements, and sometimes Congress gives the President a far more limited and highly tailored 
                                                 
33 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 5.  
34 See, e.g. E. Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 Yale L.J. 664 (1944) and L. Tribe, 
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1221 (199). But see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 228 n.18 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that 
congressional–executive agreements are “coextensive with the treaty power,” thereby contradicting his more recent 
advocacy position). 
35  O. Hathaway, Treaties’ End, at 104. 
36 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 40. See also O. Hathaway, Statement before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Operations, Human Rights and Oversight, at n.6, February 8, 2008. 
37 O. Hathaway, Treaties’ End, at 117–137. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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authority.38  Occasionally Congress requires that congressional–executive agreements negotiated 
by the President pursuant to ex ante authority must lie before Congress for some number of days 
before they enter into force.39  This waiting period allows Congress the opportunity to pass a 
statute of disapproval which, like any statute, would be subject to a Presidential veto. Congress 
often uses the ex ante approach with respect to negotiations that are noncontroversial and 
technical in nature (postal agreements, scientific cooperation) and when Congress views its role 
primarily as an appropriator of government funding.40 
Ex Post. Other times, the President will negotiate an executive agreement without prior 
congressional authority, relying instead on the President’s own powers under the Constitution 
and applicable statutes. The President then submits the final agreement to both the House and 
Senate for their review and approval. The majority of congressional–executive agreements are ex 
post agreements, reflecting the increased number of international arrangements in a globalizing 
economy and Congress’s difficulty in staying ahead of fast- moving Executive Branch-driven 
foreign policy.  
Modern Congressional–executive Agreements. Over the past century, Congress and the 
President have tended to take a third approach when addressing the most important and 
potentially controversial executive agreements. In place since World War II, this approach is a 
hybrid of the prior two.  Specifically, Congress has sometimes chosen to enact a framework 
statute that explicitly (i) grants the President the authority to negotiate one or more agreements, 
(ii) establishes somewhat general negotiating objectives for the United States, (iii) requires 
regular consultation between the executive and legislative branches, (iv) gives life to this 
requirement by demanding periodic reports from U.S. negotiators and by creating a formal 
congressional observer group to the negotiations, and, importantly, (v) creates a streamlined 
                                                 
38 For example, many of the 168 international agricultural commodity agreements concluded by the President over 
the past fifty years were authorized by a single statute (the 1954 Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act) and have not required further congressional review. The contemporaneous Trade Agreements Extension Act of 
1955, in contrast, gave the President authority to conclude trade agreements in very specific, well-defined areas. O. 
Hathaway, Treaties’ End, at 120.  
39 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 236 (listing numerous examples of agreements Congress required the 
President to transmit to Congress; many of these agreements required no further congressional action or approval). 
40 In 2005, for example, Congress chose to give ex ante approval to the agreement that allowed the United States to 
join the international consortium seeking to build an experimental electricity-producing fusion power plant (ITER). 
A main policy consideration for Congress was the high cost of the project. Having decided to fund the program, 
Congress did not ask to approve the final agreement.  The ITER agreement did lie before Congress before it entered 
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review and approval process for Congress to consider both the new agreement and any domestic 
implementing legislation needed to give the agreement effect under domestic law. This hybrid 
approval process—authorization, instruction, participation, and simplified approval—has 
become the primary means for congressional review of economically significant international 
agreements. Most trade agreements are done this way.41  The modern approach allows Congress 
to shape international negotiations from start to finish. Congress not only defines the terms for 
the future agreement but also creates for itself a place at the negotiating table. In exchange for 
this augmented role, Congress gives both the President and our allies a simplified approval 
process for securing U.S. participation. That simplified approval process strengthens the hand of 
U.S. negotiators to extract concessions from other nations to ensure that the final agreement 
meets Congress’s objectives. Other nations understand very clearly what the agreement must 
look like to secure Congress’s blessing and they have confidence that if they meet U.S. demands 
the United States will become a party to the agreement. 
Courts have upheld all three types of executive agreements.42 Most scholars consider 
them to be equally consistent with the Constitution, but that view is not universal.43  Critics of 
executive agreements have been most hostile to ex post congressional–executive agreements 
because arguably Congress has the least say in shaping these pacts, given that they merely vote 
“yeah” or “nay” at the end of the negotiations. Ex ante agreements also appear to be losing favor 
with Congress, which is growing increasingly concerned about whether it has delegated too 
much authority to the President to enter into international obligations on behalf of the United 
States. Assuming that any President would veto a bill that would invalidate an executive 
agreement negotiated by the President, ex ante authorization in effect reverses the balance of 
                                                 
41 In August 2002, for example, the United States passed the Trade Act of 2002. Until it expired in 2007, that law 
gave the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). International trade agreements negotiated under TPA were 
guaranteed a straight up-or-down vote (no amendments) in Congress within 90 days. Agreements submitted under 
TPA could not be filibustered or blocked in committee. Approval in both houses depended merely on a simple 
majority, the Senate having already reached “cloture” at the time it debated and approved TPA. Nearly every major 
international trade agreement the United States has joined in the past 30 years was negotiated, reviewed, and 
approved in a similar manner, including the WTO and NAFTA.  
42 Restatement (Third), Section 303, Reporters’ Note 7. 
43 Restatement (Third), Section 303, Reporters’ Note 7 and 8. See B. Ackerman and D. Golove, Is NAFTA 
Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995) (making the strongest recent case for “interchangeability”). But see L. Tribe, 
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1994) 
(arguing that ex ante and modern hybrid congressional–executive agreements are constitutionally suspect). Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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power between Congress and the President by requiring a supermajority of both houses to stop 
an executive agreement from binding the United States. 
III. Executive Agreements as Substitutes for Treaties 
Some disagreement exists about when the President and Congress may employ executive 
agreements instead of treaties. Most commentators agree that the Constitution requires that some 
international agreements receive the approval of Congress or the Senate. I explore these issues in 
the following paragraphs. 
A. Limits on Sole Executive Agreements 
Sole executive agreements must rest squarely within the President’s own constitutional 
authorities.44  The President may not conclude a sole executive agreement that violates rights 
protected by the Constitution, including in the Bill of Rights. The President’s legitimate 
constitutional authorities include the power to conduct foreign affairs45 and the power to 
implement laws enacted by Congress.46  Of course, the right of the President to conclude sole 
executive agreements in furtherance of authorities delegated to the President by Congress via 
statute depends on the substance of the statute(s) in question. The limit of this authority, 
therefore, is difficult to analyze in the abstract. Importantly, however, the statutes in question 
need not explicitly authorize the President to enter into sole executive agreements.47  Rather, the 
President must be able to defend any sole agreements entered into pursuant to statute as a 
necessary and proper application of the authority granted by the statute. In other words, it must 
be appropriate to implement the obligations created for the United States under existing statutory 
authorities.  
Presidents have concluded sole executive agreements relatively sparingly. Most sole 
executive agreements to date can be defended as legitimate extensions of the President’s foreign 
affairs powers, relating as they do to military or diplomatic matters having little direct impact on 
                                                 
44 Restatement (Third), Section 303(4) (“[T]he President, on his own authority, may make an international 
agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent powers under the Constitution”). 
45 See “foreign affairs powers” above in the paragraph on sole executive agreements. 
46 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3 (the President shall “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”). 
47 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 92. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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private interests in the United States.48  But this is not always the case, as when Presidents have 
used sole executive agreements to (i) alter or extinguish the rights of U.S. citizens and companies 
to pursue commercial claims against foreign governments, or (ii) restrict importation of certain 
foreign goods.49 How far can the President stretch the foreign affairs powers?  The Supreme 
Court has held that the President may not usurp legislative authorities the Constitution reserves 
for Congress.50  Although the court has not explicitly addressed the question of when a sole 
executive agreement would usurp congressional powers, some hypothetical cases seem relatively 
straight forward. The President, for example, could not conclude a sole executive agreement that 
obligated the United States to appropriate funds. The Constitution reserves this power for 
Congress alone and requires that all fiscal bills originate in the House of Representatives.  
Also, many scholars rely on the usurpation principle to argue that the President alone 
may not override an existing Federal statute. Courts have ruled somewhat inconsistently on this 
matter.51  As noted above, valid executive agreements (including those made solely by the 
President) carry the same force as a Federal statute. Allowing the President to trump a prior act 
of Congress without the consent of Congress would appear to circumvent the legislative process. 
However, the Supreme Court has determined that sole executive agreements can override and 
preempt (at least some) domestic state laws in areas where the Federal government has the 
authority to overturn state action by statute, such as on economic and trade matters.52  As Louis 
Henkin, the dean of the academic community on U.S. foreign relations law, wryly observed, 
there are permissible sole executive agreements and impermissible sole executive agreements, 
but neither the Supreme Court nor anyone else has told us which ones are which.53     
B. Limits on Treaty–Executive Agreements  
In general terms, treaty–executive agreements must relate to matters over which one or 
both of the political branches of the Federal government have competence under the 
                                                 
48 Restatement (Third), Section 303, Reporters’ Note 11.  
49 Id.  
50 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (ruling that President Truman could not take 
control of U.S. steel mills during the Korean conflict without an act of Congress). 
51 CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, at 93. 
52 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamedni, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), at 415. 
53 L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 222 (2d ed. 1996). Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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Constitution. Neither the President nor Congress may use a treaty or a treaty–executive 
agreement to abridge rights guaranteed individuals in the Constitution. Apart from this general 
restriction, the requirement that treaty–executive agreements fall within the powers of Congress 
and the President may not place any meaningful limits on the use of that method of binding the 
United States. Most international arrangements cover matters of war and peace, trade between 
nations, or other areas over which the President or Congress have clear and often overlapping 
authority.54  The Supreme Court has consistently held that the powers of the President and 
Congress to manage foreign relations and regulate international economic matters are expansive. 
It is possible to conjure up a hypothetical agreement that could be approved as a treaty but not as 
a treaty–executive agreement. 55  As a practical matter, however, the Senate may authorize the 
President to negotiate treaty–executive agreements on any subject matter simply by giving its 
advice and consent to a parent treaty  that provides for future agreements.56   
Some scholars consider treaty–executive agreements merely a subset of sole executive 
agreements. In their view, treaties are merely one source of authority the President may point to 
when justifying a decision to implement an international agreement without further 
congressional action. Unlike statutes, however, most treaties are not self-executing. Non-self-
executing treaties do not have the force of a statute for purposes of domestic law; they can only 
be enforced domestically through implementing legislation enacted by Congress. Thus, for non-
self-executing treaties, the President may look to the treaty for authority to enter into a new 
international obligation under the parent treaty, but the President may not use the treaty to justify 
domestic implementation on an executive agreement. The President would need to defend 
domestic implementation on other grounds. In contrast, self-executing treaties lend to the 
President Congress’s authorities for purposes of both domestic and international implementation. 
Duly authorized treaty–executive agreements concluded under a self-executing treaty, therefore, 
could allow the President to implement domestic programs that go well beyond the requirements 
of the original treaty. This distinction is relevant to the types of treaty–executive agreements the 
                                                 
54 But see J. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional–Executive Agreements, 99 Mich. L. 
Rev. 757, 768 (2001) (arguing for a far narrower reading of the Congress’s powers to regulate international 
commerce). 
55 See hypothetical case described, infra note 69. 
56 The Senate is not required to provide its advice and consent to a treaty after the treaty is completed. Therefore, 
the Senate may use its advice and consent vote on one treaty to give its approval to future agreements. The 
permissible scope of those agreements is broad. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding the power of 
the Federal government to conclude agreements that exceeded even the enumerated powers of the Constitution). Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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President may implement under existing climate change treaties. In part IV of this paper, I 
consider whether prior climate treaties entered into by the United States authorize the President 
to conclude treaty–executive agreements and, if so, under what circumstances. 
It is somewhat difficult to predict how a court would handle a conflict between the 
President and Congress over whether the Senate authorized an executive agreement when it 
approved a prior treaty. I am unaware of any instance in which the President has found, over the 
objections of the Senate, an explicit or implied authority to conclude a treaty–executive 
agreement. No courts appear to have opined on what standard would be applied in reviewing 
such a case, or what deference, if any, the President should be afforded in these matters. It seems 
likely, however, that our courts would give equal weight to the claim of each political branch and 
would decide the matter as they would any statutory interpretation, by looking at the plain 
language of the texts and by reviewing the legislative history for indications of congressional 
intent. Were the President to claim an implied authority, a court might reasonably place the 
burden of proof on the President to demonstrate Senate consent. 
C. Limits on Congressional–executive Agreements 
In contrast to the other two types of executive agreements, congressional–executive 
agreements are well understood, even in the abstract, and case law serves as a better guide for 
analysis. Like treaty–executive agreements, congressional–executive agreements originate from 
the powers of the President and Congress and must not exceed the powers granted either of them 
under the Constitution. Once again, for most international agreements, this limitation is of little 
consequence given the breadth of powers enjoyed by the modern Federal government. The more 
fundamental question is whether some international agreements are inherently treaties under the 
Constitution, or whether the President and Congress always have discretion to treat an 
international agreement as a congressional–executive agreement instead of as a treaty?   
Legal scholars have considered this question for the better part of a century. Throughout 
that time, the dominant legal view has remained unchanged: congressional–executive agreements 
and treaties are complete and equal substitutes regardless of the subject matter or other factors.57  
As far back as 1947, President Truman reported to Congress that treaties and executive 
                                                 
57 B. Ackerman and & D. Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995). See also J. Yoo, Laws 
as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional–Executive Agreements, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 768 (2001) 
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agreements were interchangeable.58  Louis Henkin summarizes the situation this way: “It is now 
widely accepted that the congressional–executive agreement is available for wide use, even 
general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty.”59  The highly authoritative Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, the single best legal treatise in this 
area, states that “the prevailing view is that the congressional–executive agreement can be used 
as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance.”60   Case law also supports a permissive 
approach. The U.S. Supreme Court has, for more than a century, consistently rejected or 
sidestepped claims that specific congressional–executive agreements should have been deemed 
treaties.61 Indeed, no court has ever invalidated a congressional–executive agreement on the 
grounds that it should have been handled as a treaty.62  
It is certainly not the case that the most important international agreements need to be 
treaties. For example, congressional–executive agreements were used to approve (i) the Bretton 
Woods agreement (creating the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), (ii) the NAFTA 
and WTO (which regulate roughly a third of the goods and services in the U.S. economy), (iii) 
the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement with the Soviet Union, (iv) agreements 
creating major U.N. agencies, and (v) the legal instruments incorporating Texas and Hawaii into 
the United States. 63   
The State Department’s treaty manual lists eight qualitative factors for the Department to 
consider when classifying an international agreement, including the agreement’s urgency and 
duration, the scope of its obligations, the wishes of Congress, and past U.S. practice.64  The 
treaty manual, however, makes clear that these factors are not legal tests. Rather, they are merely 
indicators of conformity with historical practice and guideposts for avoiding political conflict 
                                                 
58 H. Doc. No. 378, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 3, 1947) cited in J. Yoo supra. 
59 L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution, 217, 2d ed. (1996). 
60 Restatement (Third), at 303 (emphasis added). 
61 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 651 (1892) (upholding congressional delegation of authority to the President to 
approve certain trade and tariffs agreements) and Made in USA Foundation v. United States, 56 F. Supp.2d 1226 
(1999), vacated, 242 F.3f 1300, cert denied, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001) (finding that the President and Congress had the 
power to conclude NAFTA as a congressional–executive agreement). See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 
(1920) (upholding international agreements that exceeded the specific numerated powers of Congress). 
62 J. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional–Executive Agreements, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 
762 (2001). 
63 Id., at 761. 
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with Congress. These considerations, the State Department confirms, do not constrain the 
President and Congress.65 
The discretion the President and Congress have to bind the United States through a 
congressional–executive agreement is so broad that they can use that method to substantially 
modify the obligations of the United States under an existing treaty that received the advice and 
consent of the Senate.66  This is most clearly the case when the President negotiates a new 
standalone agreement with our treaty partners, in which case the new executive agreement 
supersedes the old treaty, but does not formally amend the treaty or become adopted pursuant to 
it. Recently, the Senate has expressed its desire to provide advice and consent to formal 
amendments to treaties. Whether such amendments must be approved with the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate is a matter of debate between the Senate and the Executive 
Branch.67  The Senate has taken a more flexible approach toward executive agreements that 
supersede treaty obligations, but members of the Senate have sometimes objected in these cases 
too.68 The power to alter, via executive agreements, obligations contained in existing treaty 
commitments will prove relevant to climate change.  
Before settling on the view that treaties and congressional–executive agreements are 
interchangeable, however, we must contend with certain historical practices and trends. 
Recently, a few helpful empirical studies have sought to make sense of when and why the United 
States turns to treaties versus congressional–executive agreements.69  Some of these studies have 
analyzed thousands of international agreements to characterize U.S. practice in each area of 
international law. The most rigorous of these studies has concluded that our government has 
been inconsistent. The United States has approved congressional–executive agreements in just 
about every subject matter area, including international trade, foreign aid, monetary policy, 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to Alan J. Kreczko, Special 
Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, November 25, 1996. See CRS, 
Treaties and Other Agreements, at 181. 
67 Id., at 179. 
68 Memorandum for John Quin, Counsel to the President, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General (June 
26, 1996) (describing bills intended to block the President from altering commitments in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty via an executive agreement). 
69 See O. Hathaway, Treaties’ End, J. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional–Executive 
Agreements, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 768 (2001) and P. Shiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional 
Method, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 961 (2001). Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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environment, nuclear cooperation, space exploration, international security, and arms control. 
But we have also approved treaties in these areas. Further, our historical practice has evolved. 
Many areas formerly handled as treaties are now handled as congressional–executive 
agreements, such as agreements setting tariffs on a range of commodities. The evolution of U.S. 
practice, however, does not fully explain away inconsistencies in our treaty practice. In some 
areas, such as trade, we have consistently negotiated treaties and executive agreements side-by-
side. Yet the studies demonstrate that, despite these unexplainable inconsistencies, the President 
and Congress have tended to favor the treaty form when international agreements relate to 
extradition, human rights, dispute resolution, arms control, aviation, labor standards, consular 
relations, taxation, telecommunications, and the environment and natural resources.  
What should one make of these historical tendencies?  Some scholars argue that the 
Constitution should be interpreted as requiring executive agreements and treaties to occupy 
“separate spheres”—that is, we should reserve some international subject matters for treaties and 
perhaps use congressional–executive agreements exclusively in other areas. On its face, this 
theory is not unreasonable. On questions relating to foreign affairs, where the text of the 
Constitution does not provide clear guidance, the Supreme Court looks to the actual practice of 
the President and Congress to help it interpret the Constitution.70 The most complete, current, 
and persuasive empirical review of U.S. treaty practice to date finds “no persuasive explanation” 
for when treaties should be used instead of congressional–executive agreements “based on the 
subject matter, form, topic, or any other substantive difference.”71  Rather, the study finds that 
any consistency in classifying certain types of agreements lies in historical accident and 
anachronistic tradition, rather than law and principle.72  Therefore, any existing tendencies to 
classify certain types of agreements as treaties rather than executive agreements should not and 
do not bind the President and Congress going forward.  
Interestingly, one scholar believes that past practice demonstrates that congressional–
executive agreements should be encouraged for issues that fall within the authorities granted 
Congress by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which delineates legislative powers to 
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regulate interstate and international commerce.73  Review by both houses of Congress is 
essential, in this view, when an international agreement is very similar to traditional domestic 
legislation. For example, economic agreements and those regulating individual behavior should 
be handled as congressional–executive agreements, according to this view. This reasoning 
appears to justify climate change congressional–executive agreements because climate policies 
affect every aspect of our economy and society.74  But overall, the view that treaties and 
congressional–executive agreements occupy separate spheres is not supported by the actual 
practice of the United States. In many areas of international law—including investment, 
maritime matters, education, nuclear safety and technology, judicial and criminal assistance, and 
trade75—the United States uses both methods to create binding international obligations.  
Thus, the law is relatively settled. Over the past seventy years, U.S. courts, the weight of 
scholarly opinion, and the empirical practice of the United States support the proposition that, for 
virtually any76 international agreement the United States could enter into as a treaty, it could 
alternatively enter into as a congressional–executive agreement. Of course, the legality of 
approving an international agreement as a congressional–executive agreement does not mean 
that Congress—and the Senate in particular—will agree to do so.  
                                                 
73 J. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional–Executive Agreements, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 
768 (2001). 
74 Professor Yoo reaches a somewhat different conclusion. He believes that many domestic environmental statutes 
are on somewhat shaky constitutional ground. He holds a narrow view of the powers of Congress under the 
commerce clause of the Constitution. Therefore, he is reluctant to say that international environmental agreements 
fall within the powers of Congress under Article 1, Section 8. The Supreme Court, of course, has held that the 
commerce clause and other Constitutional authorities do allow the Federal government to regulate the environment 
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Congressional power, then international environmental agreements would be exactly the type of agreement that 
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849. 
75 O. Hathaway, Treaties’ End, at 117. 
76 It is possible to imagine a hypothetical case, however. Congressional–executive agreements rest on the 
enumerated powers of Congress and the President in the Constitution. In contrast, the landmark Supreme Court case 
Missouri v. Holland determined that the treaty power is “additional to and independent of the delegations to the 
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D. Who Decides the Form? 
The President may bring into force sole executive agreements and treaty–executive 
agreements without review by Congress. For international agreements that require explicit 
congressional approval, the President and Congress may properly decide to secure congressional 
approval either via the treaty process or by statute via congressional–executive agreements. 
Deciding among these options is sometimes politically controversial and can give rise to 
litigation. Who may decide how any specific international agreement will be classified and 
reviewed?  
The short answer is that the President decides in consultation with Congress. Federal 
courts have held that deciding whether to classify an international agreement as a treaty or 
executive agreement is a “political question” to be made solely by the President and Congress.77  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, for example, vacated a lawsuit by labor and 
manufacturing interests that challenged the constitutionality of NAFTA. The court ruled that the 
decision by the President and Congress to classify NAFTA as an executive agreement rather than 
as a treaty was nonjusticiable (i.e., not for the courts to review).78  The court’s decision in this 
and other similar cases reflects the general inclination of U.S. courts to defer to the political 
branches in matters of foreign affairs. When Congress and the President decide jointly to take up 
an international agreement as a congressional–executive agreement, they may do so without 
judicial review and therefore without regard to any rights asserted by private citizens, 
corporations, or even specific members of Congress. As a matter of law and practice, therefore, 
the President and Congress may bind the United States under international law via a 
congressional–executive agreement “on any subject that falls within the powers of Congress and 
of the President under the Constitution.”79  Any such congressional–executive agreement 
functions as the supreme law of the land in the sense that it overrides inconsistent state laws and 
prior federal laws, as well as prior international agreements, including treaties.80  The State 
Department’s treaty manual reaffirms the political nature of classification decisions when it calls 
                                                 
77 Made in USA Foundation v. United States, 56 F. Supp.2d 1226 (1999), vacated, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319–1320, cert 
denied, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001); Restatement (Third), Section 303, Comment e. See also S. Charnowitz, Using 
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79 Restatement (Third), Section 303(2).  
80 Restatement (Third), Section 101(1), Comment d. Resources for the Future  Purvis 
27 
for the Department to consult with Congress on potentially controversial decisions about how to 
treat an international agreement.81   
But what if the President and Congress disagree? Formally, the classification decision is 
made solely by the President when the Executive Branch transmits the agreement to the Senate 
or Congress for review.82  In practice, Presidents are reluctant to ignore the advice of Congress. 
If it disagrees with the President’s classification decision, Congress may disapprove the 
agreement by voting it down (in the case of a congressional–executive agreement) or by passing 
a subsequent statute that invalidates it (in the case of a sole presidential agreement). Congress 
may even refuse to consider a treaty or congressional–executive agreement at all, absent a prior 
statute requiring Congress to act. The President would have no legal recourse to challenge these 
purely legislative acts. Major disputes between the President and Congress regarding how to 
classify an international agreement are rare. Presidents need Congress’s cooperation for many 
reasons. Important international agreements are often controversial with the American people, 
and Presidents usually seek the support of Congress as a proxy for securing the consent of the 
public at large. Further, securing the concurrence of Congress, even when it is not legally 
necessary, is often good politics. 
When conflicts do arise, generally they are between the President and the Senate rather 
than Congress as a whole. 83  The Senate tends to play a more active role in foreign affairs than 
the House. In the context of congressional–executive agreements, moreover, it is the Senate’s 
monopoly concerning treaties that seems diminished. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
Senate has adopted procedures for promoting consultation between the executive branch and 
Congress on the form of prospective international agreements.84  These procedures require 
regular State Department consultation with appropriate congressional committees in advance of 
international negotiations. They also require the State Department to send the foreign relations 
committees of the Senate and House a list of significant international agreements under 
negotiation to ensure that Congress is fully informed and has a chance to weigh in with the 
executive branch on both substance and form. In contrast to the Senate, the House prefers 
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congressional–executive agreements over treaties because the House plays a formal role only in 
approving the former. Yet the House usually has a say either way because most major treaties 
require implementing legislation—approved by the House and the Senate—to give them effect 
under domestic law, and Presidents generally consider securing that legislation a prerequisite for 
the United States to join the agreements.85   
IV. Envisioning Climate Change Executive Agreements 
In this section, I use the general legal framework discussed above to evaluate the 
usefulness of climate change executive agreements. Specifically, I analyze the commitments the 
United States might make in future climate agreements and examine whether those commitments 
would prove suitable for the three different types of executive agreements. 
A. Types of Climate Commitments 
Substance affects the form of an international agreement.  For both sole executive 
agreements and treaty–executive agreements, the nature of U.S. commitments in an agreement 
helps determine whether the President may bring the agreement into force without congressional 
action. And even though congressional–executive agreements lend themselves to virtually any 
subject, the nature of the agreements may influence the Senate’s willingness to forgo the treaty 
process. To understand whether executive agreements on climate change might prove useful, 
therefore, we must first consider what future climate agreements might require of the United 
States. 
To date, international climate policy discussions have centered on a handful of possible, 
and not necessarily mutually exclusive, climate change commitments. An illustrative list of the 
most widely discussed options is provided in Box 2. This universe of potential climate 
commitments can be lumped into three broad categories for purposes of U.S. foreign relations 
law—economic regulation, fiscal policy, and the exercise of traditional foreign affairs powers.  
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Box 2: Illustrative Climate Commitments*   
•  National or regional emissions abatement 
targets and timetables of various sorts, 
including absolute, economy-wide targets 
(like Kyoto), indexed or intensity targets 
(e.g., linked to GDP), and conditional 
targets (such as escape clauses or “safety-
valves” if costs run too high). 
 
•  Nationally determined, but not 
internationally negotiated, policies or 
standards, such as efficiency standards, 
renewable energy production targets, or 
sustainable forestry measures. 
 
•  Harmonized international, sector-specific 
standards or codes of conduct; for 
example, defining common fuel economy 
standards for automobiles or requiring the 
use of renewable energy sources. 
 
•  Science and technology cooperation to 
research and develop technologies such 
as fuel cells and carbon capture and 
sequestration, or to assess potential geo-
engineering approaches. 
 
•  Efforts to facilitate broader access to new 
and emerging climate-friendly energy 
technologies. 
 
•  Measures to help countries, particularly 
poor and vulnerable developing nations, 
adapt to inevitable climate change  
 
•  Creation of new financial mechanisms or 
funds to advance any of these goals. 
•   
* Adapted from D. Bondansky and E. Diringer, 
Advancing the International Effort Against Climate 
Change: Towards an Integrated Multi-Track 
Framework, Pew Center on Global Climate Change 
(2007).  
Economic Regulation. The United States could regulate its economy to control its 
greenhouse gas emissions and provide incentives for other nations to do so. For example, the 
United States could (i) bind itself 
internationally to a national emissions target 
and timetable (as intended by the Clinton 
administration’s policies toward the Kyoto 
Protocol); (ii) adopt new energy efficiency 
or technology mandates for various 
commercial sectors (motor vehicles, 
appliances, electricity generation, buildings, 
and manufacturing); or (iii) agree to alter 
existing rules governing international trade 
and access to U.S. markets to create 
incentives for other nations to reduce 
emissions.  
Fiscal Policy. The United States 
could agree to specific fiscal policies by 
taxing actual emissions or emissions-
intensive goods or by spending public 
monies to promote climate solutions (e.g., 
by funding research and development 
programs for advanced energy 
technologies). Although global climate 
agreements to date have included some 
fiscal commitments, these obligations have 
tended to be very general and therefore 
largely unenforceable. One could imagine, 
however, a massive publicly-funded effort to 
develop the next generation of energy 
technologies or a global strategy to assist 
developing nations acquire clean energy 
technologies. 
Traditional Diplomacy. The United 
States could create international Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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organizations, processes, and institutions to facilitate climate cooperation, strengthen information 
sharing, deepen scientific collaboration, promote “best practices” by private companies, and 
improve public education on climate change. Such an approach is exemplified by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose scientific contributions to climate change 
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. 
Although perhaps overly simplistic, these categories are helpful because they line up 
nicely with specific constitutional authorities held by the President and Congress. Therefore, 
these three categories of climate commitments influence the availability and usefulness of the 
three types of executive agreements. 
B. Sole Executive Climate Agreements  
The President may conclude sole executive climate agreements if they are pursuant to 
legitimate Presidential authorities and do not usurp the exclusive legislative function of 
Congress. The first two types of climate commitments—economic regulation and fiscal policy—
are legislative powers under the Constitution, as discussed earlier. The President has the power 
under the Constitution to implement U.S. fiscal policy but may not alter U.S. tax and 
appropriation laws without the approval of Congress in the form of a new statute. Sole executive 
agreements that create new taxes and spending obligations for the United States would therefore 
be difficult to defend. Further, the Constitution gives Congress, not the President, the power to 
regulate interstate and international commerce.86  Sole executive agreements intended to regulate 
the U.S. economy—by capping emissions; imposing efficiency, technology, or other 
performance standards; or by changing U.S. tariffs or other provisions relating to international 
trade—would prove difficult to defend unless Congress had already authorized the President to 
implement such regulations under an existing statute.  
The President does have authority under the Constitution to implement Federal statutes, 
however.87  This means that the President may implement economic regulation, spend monies, 
and raise taxes pursuant to authorities appropriately delegated by Congress by statute. Congress 
appropriates funds annually, and no existing statute provides a compelling basis for the President 
to create a long-term climate change spending obligation. Similarly, Congress has not authorized 
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the President to obligate the United States to change its tax laws for climate change purposes. In 
contrast, Congress may very well have authorized the President, via the Clean Air Act,88 to 
regulate the U.S. economy to control climate pollution. With respect to traditional diplomacy, the 
Executive Branch has a somewhat freer hand because of the President’s inherent foreign affairs 
authorities under the Constitution. I examine, in this section, the extent to which these authorities 
provide a basis for sole executive agreements on climate change. 
1. Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act of 1963, as amended,89 authorizes the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to regulate air pollutants to protect public health. The traditional targets of the act 
have been dangerous levels of smog and local air pollution. Opinions have differed on whether 
the Clean Air Act provides a sufficient statutory basis to control and reduce U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Clinton administration believed the act could be made to work for that purpose 
even if its authorities were not ideally crafted for climate change. The Bush administration has 
maintained that the statute does not provide EPA with authority to enact climate regulations. In 
2007, a sharply divided Supreme Court held that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions under the Clean Air Act, subject to certain scientific findings the agency must now 
examine regarding the extent of the threat posed by climate change.90  Most observers believe 
that EPA ultimately will be obligated to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. If this is the case, the 
Clean Air Act could be used by the President to justify sole executive agreements that obligate 
the United States internationally to take whatever measures the EPA has authority to undertake 
domestically pursuant to the act, absent a new statute enacted by Congress altering EPA’s newly 
validated climate authority. 
The Clean Air Act explicitly authorizes the President to negotiate international 
agreements to protect the Earth’s upper atmosphere. The statute provides: 
 
The President shall undertake to enter into international agreements to 
foster cooperative research which complements studies and research 
authorized by this title, and to develop standards and regulations which 
                                                 
88 Supra, note 81. 
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protect the stratosphere consistent with regulations applicable within the 
United States. For these purposes the President . . . shall negotiate 
multilateral treaties, conventions, resolutions, or other agreements, and 
formulate, present, or support proposals at the United Nations and other 
appropriate international forums and shall report to Congress periodically 
on efforts to arrive at such agreements.91 
This provision was enacted in connection with international efforts to address ozone 
depletion in the upper atmosphere under the 1987 Montreal Protocol.92  Whether this provision 
of the Clean Air Act authorizes international climate agreements may rest on whether authority 
to negotiate agreements to “protect the stratosphere” includes the authority to negotiate 
agreements that protect the stratosphere and other parts of the atmosphere equally.93  But even if 
the act does not explicitly authorize the Executive Branch to negotiate international agreements, 
the President could rely on the general authority provided by the Clean Air Act to regulate air 
pollution. That authority, assuming it exists domestically, could justify sole executive 
agreements that furthered the purposes of the act even if they were not envisioned by the Act. 
The Supreme Court has held that domestic statutes need not explicitly authorize international 
negotiations for the President to rely on those statutes to implement executive agreements, 
provided that the agreements can be implemented under domestic law consistent with those 
statutes.94  The Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), a multilateral 
agreement that creates a framework to reduce the pollution its name describes, was entered into 
by the United States as a sole executive agreement precisely because the Clean Air Act provided 
sufficient authority for the President to comply with the agreement. Congress never authorized 
the LRTAP negotiations, nor did it bless the final executive agreement. U.S. practice includes 
several similar examples of executive agreements having to do with the environment that were 
concluded without the authorization of Congress and implemented based entirely on existing 
environmental statutes. 
Assuming that the Clean Air Act is found to allow EPA to regulate climate emissions, the 
act as it stands today might reasonably provide the legal basis for sole executive agreements that 
                                                 
91 Clean Air Act, Title VI, Section 617. 
92 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987). 
93 The stratosphere begins roughly five to six miles above the surface of the Earth. Greenhouse gases are found in the 
stratosphere but in smaller quantities than the troposphere, the area beneath the stratosphere and above the Earth’s 
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require the United States to set domestic standards for emissions from mobile and stationary 
sources. The Clean Air Act provides EPA clear regulatory authority in each of these areas. To 
the extent that any of these regulations create private markets for tradable emissions permits, the 
President could probably enter into sole executive agreements that link U.S. and comparable 
international markets for carbon-denominated securities, including Europe’s Emissions Trading 
System. Such an agreement could be implemented domestically by EPA through a regulation 
allowing U.S. companies to demonstrate compliance with domestic climate regulations by 
depositing qualifying foreign emissions permits with EPA. The President might also enter into an 
executive agreement requiring the United States to allow U.S. companies to demonstrate their 
compliance with any new Clean Air Act climate regulations by purchasing rights to verified 
emissions reductions achieved in developing nations (sometimes called “offsets”). Taken 
together, this fairly robust suite of international commitments could go a long way toward 
helping the United States convince other nations to abate their emissions, and thus could 
constitute a major climate change foreign policy.  
However, the Clean Air Act may not authorize all that a President may wish to do on 
climate change. It is debatable whether the Clean Air Act would authorize EPA to create an 
economy-wide cap-and-trade program since the act provides different authorities for each major 
source of air pollution. If such a program ought to be the centerpiece of U.S. climate foreign 
policy, as many climate policy experts believe, then that potential shortcoming is serious. The 
Clean Air Act, in addition, provides no applicable authority to regulate international trade and 
amend U.S. tariff schedules, although it does allow EPA to regulate equally both foreign and 
domestic goods in the U.S. economy. The Clean Air Act does not authorize the President to 
obligate the United States to provide financial assistance to developing nations that would enable 
them to mitigate their emissions or adapt to climate change.95  Even if it did, Congress would 
need to appropriate funds annually. 
2. Foreign Affairs Powers 
The President’s foreign affairs power includes the right to decide, absent a statute to the 
contrary, how best to carry forward U.S. diplomacy.  The President could rather easily defend 
sole executive agreements that obligate the United States to take steps designed to facilitate the 
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process of climate diplomacy. Such sole executive agreements might, for example, accomplish 
the following: 
 
•  Protect the competitiveness of U.S. companies and promote international climate action 
by creating a framework authorizing nations to impose certain trade or other measures 
against nations that do not take sufficient action to abate their emissions, provided that 
those measures would neither violate U.S. obligations under the WTO or other 
international agreements nor require changes in U.S. tariff schedules.  
 
•  Create international mechanisms to help developing nations acquire access to clean 
energy technologies and reduce emissions from deforestation, provided that U.S. 
obligations to fund these programs depend on future congressional appropriations. 
 
•  Create an international fund to help developing nations adapt to climate change, provided 
that U.S. obligations to contribute to the fund depend on future congressional 
appropriations.  
 
•  Obligate the United States to participate in a more robust system for reporting and 
reviewing national climate programs and emissions, provided that this did not violate any 
provision of domestic law. 
 
•  Strengthen international scientific cooperation, subject to congressional appropriation of 
funds. 
Thus, the President could rely on his or her inherent foreign affairs powers to jumpstart 
the process of U.S. climate diplomacy. That said, the caveats mentioned in each case highlight 
the need for congressional approval when the process of climate diplomacy turns substantive. 
Because the Constitution makes foreign affairs an area of shared responsibility between the 
President and Congress, the President may not go it alone even in some of these process areas. 
The President, for example, may not commit the United States to membership in a new 
international organization – such as a new global energy technology research agency – for more 
than one year without the approval of Congress.96 
3. Observations on Sole Executive Agreements 
The examples given above related to the Clean Air Act and foreign affairs powers 
describe what the President may do as a matter of law, not what the President should do as a 
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matter of policy. Whether authorized by the Constitution or the Clean Air Act, the President 
could obligate the United States to implement a wide range of economically, environmentally, 
and diplomatically significant climate commitments. Some of these commitments would require 
a subsequent act of Congress to give them effect, such as an appropriation, but many climate 
commitments would not. If the President entered into a major climate change sole executive 
agreement, this would undoubtedly create a domestic political firestorm. Widespread bipartisan 
political support is a precondition for an effective and enduring U.S. climate change foreign 
policy. That kind of policy is unlikely to emerge if the President charges ahead without 
Congress. On the other hand, congressional inaction should not handcuff the President and derail 
international climate cooperation. On matters that are sure to engender domestic controversy, 
perhaps the prospect of sole executive agreements should encourage Congress to find common 
ground with the President and the international community. For controversial matters that would 
impose major costs on the U.S. economy, the President should turn to sole executive agreements 
as a last resort. 
C. Treaty–Executive Climate Agreements   
The President may conclude, without further congressional review, an executive 
agreement on climate change that the Senate authorized explicitly or implicitly when it gave its 
advice and consent to a prior treaty. In late 1992, the Senate approved and the United States 
became a party to a major climate treaty—the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (the “Convention”), which provides a framework for international cooperation in this 
area. The treaty set forth principles to guide international efforts, including provisions allocating 
(in the most general terms) the responsibility for action among developed and developing 
nations. The Convention also imposed reporting obligations on parties to improve information 
sharing and future decision making.  
In view of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in a treaty case,97 the Convention is 
probably not self-executing so its provisions probably do not have status under domestic law 
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directly.98  (The Convention itself is silent on the self-execution issue. The United States was 
able to implement the Convention under existing statutes without passing new implementing 
legislation.)  Accordingly, the Senate’s advice and consent to the Convention may provide no 
additional basis for the President to implement any executive agreements domestically. Instead, 
for purposes of domestic implementation the President probably needs to rely on the authorities 
granted by the Constitution and those delegated by Congress through statute, including the Clean 
Air Act. What new domestic authority, if any, however, does the Convention provide for the 
President to bind the United States internationally, without regard to domestic implementation? 99   
The Convention envisions that the parties to the agreement will adopt additional legal 
instruments under the Convention. Article 2 states:  
 
“[T]he ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal 
instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” (Emphasis 
added.)   
 
The Convention also provides that state parties may amend the agreement from time to 
time. Article 15 stipulates that amendments shall enter into force for those parties that agree to be 
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bound by the amendments once three-fourths of all parties to the Convention have so agreed. 
State parties that do not so agree shall not be bound by the amendments. 
The Convention created a number of international bodies, vesting them with distinct roles 
and decision making powers. Foremost among these is the Conference of Parties (COP), which 
the Convention describes as the “supreme body” of the treaty. Article 7 of the Convention 
stipulates that the COP should meet yearly to review implementation of the Convention and 
“related instruments” that the COP may adopt to achieve the objective of the Convention. The 
Convention also provides that the COP shall review the “adequacy of commitments” by state 
parties and take appropriate action, including the adoption of new commitments needed to 
achieve the objective of the Convention. Notably, the sole purpose of Article 17 of the 
Convention is to spell out rules by which the COP may “adopt protocols to the Convention.”  
(These rules describe the process to be followed at the international level but do not address how 
the United States would review new protocols under domestic law.) 
Given the emphasis the Convention places on subsidiary climate agreements or protocols, 
it is perhaps not surprising that, at the time the Senate debated the treaty, its members inquired 
about the domestic process the United States would follow to review amendments and protocols 
to the Convention. During a hearing on the Convention before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, committee members asked the first Bush administration whether protocols to the 
Convention would be submitted to the Senate for its approval. The administration responded in 
writing that it expected that protocols to the Convention would come before the Senate, 
depending on the substance of the new agreements.100  The administration gave a similar answer 
with respect to amendments to the Convention.  
The Committee also asked specifically how the first Bush administration would treat an 
amendment or protocol to the Convention that contained legally binding greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction targets. At the time, the international community was already discussing this 
idea and several witnesses before the Committee, including Vice Presidential candidate Al Gore, 
called on the United States to move in this direction.101  The administration responded to the 
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Committee’s question in writing by noting that it “would expect such a protocol to be submitted 
to the Senate.”102  The administration did not say explicitly that it would handle such protocols as 
treaties, merely that the agreements would come before the Senate for approval. As the first Bush 
administration did not mention congressional–executive agreements, the Committee may have 
inferred that the administration would treat any such protocol as a treaty.  
When the Senate approved the Convention, it did not seek to formally condition its 
consent on amendments or protocols to the Convention coming back before the Senate. The 
report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, however, included language intended to protect 
the Senate’s prerogatives.103  The report stated that, in the view of the Committee, any 
amendment or protocol to the Convention that adopted emissions targets would have to be 
submitted to the Senate. The committee’s opinion on this matter and the first Bush 
administration’s views were cited by at least one Senator during the full Senate’s debate on the 
Convention.104   
Legally, the legislative history in the context of treaty–executive agreements is not 
controlling. The first Bush administration’s assurances and opinions do not bind future 
Presidents. Further, the first Bush administration did not promise to submit all protocols to the 
Convention to the Senate, nor did the Senate condition its approval on congressional review of 
subordinate agreements. Congress and the President remain free to decide that the Senate has 
already authorized amendments and protocols to the Convention, freeing up the President to 
enter into treaty–executive agreements. Our courts probably would consider such a decision to be 
a nonjusticiable political question and would defer to the political branches.  
Given the legislative record, however, the Senate today may expect that it would give 
advice and consent to major protocols and amendments to the Convention. The depth and 
strength of this sentiment would surely depend on the politics of the moment, but we must 
assume that enough key Senators would insist that any President think twice before ignoring 
their views. Presidents usually bow to the Senate’s desire to review international agreements 
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once the Senate provides informal assurances that the agreements will receive timely and fair 
consideration.105 
In sum, it would be difficult for the President to implement protocols and amendments to 
the Convention without first securing the Senate’s approval one way or another. Moreover, the 
President has little incentive to do so. Because the Convention may not be self-executing, the 
President might not be able to point to it as authority to implement under domestic law new 
executive agreements on climate change. All told, treaty–executive agreements provide little 
benefit in the climate context at present. 
D. Congressional–executive Climate Agreements 
Presidents, the Congress, the courts and the vast majority of U.S. legal scholars consider 
congressional—executive agreements complete and equally valid substitutes for virtually all 
treaties. Were Congress to approve a congressional—executive climate change agreement, the 
courts would be highly likely to uphold the agreement.106   
But what if a court concluded that treaties and congressional–executive agreements are 
not interchangeable because the Constitution should be interpreted as requiring them to occupy 
separate spheres?  Even in this unlikely event, a court might hold that many major climate 
change agreements may be handled by the President and Congress as congressional–executive 
agreements. A climate change agreement that created new mandatory emissions limits for the 
United States, for example, could prove costly and affect every sector of the U.S. economy. 
Implementing such an agreement would require the Federal government to regulate commerce, 
create new controls on private action, and make substantial appropriations. Under the separate 
spheres theory, these are precisely the circumstances under which congressional–executive 
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agreements are most legitimate because they most closely resemble domestic statutes that require 
the approval of both houses of Congress.107 
As a matter of law, the President and Congress are free to disregard past U.S. practice in 
terms of obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate on international agreements. However, 
the tendency of the United States to use the treaty form in certain areas may create political, 
rather than legal, obstacles. The President and Congress tend to treat multilateral environmental 
agreements as treaties, but this practice has not been uniform. The United States, for example, is 
using a congressional–executive agreement to handle a recent protocol to the LRTAP 
convention108 that will reduce global stocks of the most dangerous persistent organic pollutants. 
The original LRTAP convention under which the protocol was negotiated also was handled by 
the United States as an executive agreement. Thus, in terms of multilateral agreements 
addressing air pollution and the atmosphere generally, neither the President nor Congress should 
claim too strong an expectation regarding form. 
The global negotiations on climate change that were launched by the international 
community in December 2007 are occurring under the Convention. The legislative history of the 
Senate’s approval of the Convention highlighted the Senate’s nonbinding but nonetheless clear 
desire to review major protocols or amendments to the Convention. Of course, the legislative 
history of the Convention would be irrelevant with respect to any climate agreement that the 
President concluded outside the Convention because that idea did not arise during the ratification 
debate in 1992. This insight is relevant because the international community has the legal 
authority to decide that the new global climate pact should stand alone, outside the Convention, 
even though that is not currently the approach being taken. This outcome would be highly 
unlikely unless the United States insisted. India, China, Brazil, and other developing nations 
attach great importance to the Convention’s general principles and, other things being equal, 
prefer to keep all global climate pacts under that umbrella. One can only speculate whether an 
engaged U.S. President could convince these nations to take a different approach and what 
incentives might be necessary to do so. 
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Therefore, we may assume that the new global agreement will remain formally under the 
Convention. But a protocol to a treaty does not have to be a treaty. As a matter of law, “it lies 
within the power of Congress to authorize the President [by means of a congressional–executive 
agreement] substantially to modify the United States’ domestic and international legal 
obligations under a prior treaty.”109  As U.S. treaty practice evolves, many agreements that 
formerly would have been concluded as treaties are now done as congressional–executive 
agreements or even sole executive agreements. Examples of this include tariff agreements on 
commodities, security agreements and debt agreements.110  A decision to treat a protocol to the 
Convention as a congressional–executive agreement therefore would not be unprecedented and 
would, in fact, reflect the overall evolution of U.S. international agreements. Furthermore, the 
fact that a supermajority of the Senate already approved the Convention arguably makes an 
expeditious approach to subordinate agreements even more legitimate. 
Four points stand out from the legislative history of U.S. ratification of the Convention. 
First, as a matter of law, the Senate may handle new climate change agreements, including those 
negotiated under the Convention, as congressional–executive agreements. Second, the first Bush 
administration did not promise the Senate that it would submit all protocols to the Convention as 
treaties.111  Third, it remains unclear from the legislative record whether the Senate attached 
particular importance to the treaty process per se or merely sought assurances that the President 
would not enter into protocols to the Convention without Senate or Congressional review. 
Neither the first Bush administration nor the Senate appears to have considered whether future 
Senate review should be achieved via the treaty process or through congressional–executive 
agreements.112  Fourth, today’s Senate could make a reasonable argument that the legislative 
history—and the somewhat inconsistent tendency of the United States to treat multilateral 
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environmental agreements as treaties—gives rise to an expectation that protocols and 
amendments to the Convention will be treaties. However, we must not assume that the Senate’s 
views on this matter are immutable. As support builds for Federal action on climate change, so 
will interest in bringing into force a global agreement that creates a level playing field for U.S. 
companies by requiring other nations to take climate action. This dynamic is a familiar pattern in 
U.S. environmental diplomacy.113  In addition, the Senate understands that U.S. opposition to 
global climate agreements is a symbol of a “go-it-alone” U.S. foreign policy that the next 
President and Congress will wish to bury. Yet the President would be wise to consult with the 
Senate before deciding to use the congressional–executive agreement form. Because the Senate’s 
consent will be needed for a congressional–executive agreement anyway, the President can ill 
afford to alienate the Senate by presuming to decide unilaterally the form of future climate 
agreements.  
V. The Case for Climate Protection Authority  
New climate change agreements, including the new global agreement being negotiated 
now, should be treated as modern congressional–executive agreements. The United States should 
create “Climate Protection Authority” that allows our country to negotiate and approve climate 
agreements as we do international trade deals. In this section, I highlight the virtues of the trade 
model, make the case for applying that model to climate change and highlight the immediate 
opportunity U.S. policymakers have to do just that. 
The United States should export four aspects of its international trade agreement practice 
to its handling of climate change deals. First, major trade agreements are congressional–
executive agreements. Second, most trade agreements are negotiated and approved pursuant to 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) such that Congress passes a framework statute that authorizes 
the President to negotiate new trade deals and instructs the President to submit any concluded 
agreements to Congress for its final approval (i.e., the modern congressional–executive 
agreement discussed above). Third, TPA creates mechanisms for improving coordination 
between the Executive Branch and Congress during the negotiating process. Fourth, TPA 
commits Congress to review trade agreements such that each agreement receives a timely, 
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straight up-or-down vote without amendments. Climate Protection Authority would apply these 
policies and procedures to international climate agreements. 
It is important to distinguish between the procedural characteristics of TPA, on one hand, 
and the question of whether existing trade agreements have been good for the United States. In 
this essay I do not take a position on the latter question. Instead, I argue that importing the 
process the United States uses in trade agreements makes sense for climate change agreements. 
Most opponents of TPA—environmental, labor, and consumer groups—have not advocated 
against TPA’s procedural mechanisms per se; rather, they have opposed TPA bills that place 
little emphasis on strengthening environmental protection, labor standards, and consumer rights. 
If U.S. trade negotiating objectives made improving environmental, labor, and consumer 
standards a top priority, the opponents of TPA might favor it and businesses might oppose the 
mechanism. In other words, where one stands on TPA depends on what one expects from the 
trade agreements negotiated under it. The same would be true of climate change. I provide an 
initial political analysis of why the trade model might advance the interests of many interest 
groups in the final portion of this paper.  What I wish to emphasize now, however, is that in a 
strictly procedural sense the trade model works. The United States is often able to reach a 
bipartisan consensus on trade negotiations via TPA legislation and Presidents usually bring back 
trade agreements that Congress approves (although often by a small margin). 
Why is this the case? TPA empowers U.S. trade negotiators to reach better trade 
agreements by making the United States a more credible and reliable negotiating partner.114  
Under TPA, U.S. negotiating positions carry more weight internationally because our demands 
enjoy broad domestic political support and are enacted into law.115  Other nations are more likely 
to make politically difficult trade concessions when they believe Congress is unlikely to ask the 
President to renegotiate key terms, and when U.S. domestic approval is probable and should 
occur without unwarranted delay.116  Simplified congressional review procedures are especially 
important for global trade negotiations because those deals are highly complex, take years and 
sometimes decades to conclude, involve a very large number of nations, and are particularly 
difficult to renegotiate.  By reducing the requirement for Senate approval from two-thirds to a 
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simple majority, TPA increases the likelihood that the United States will join new trade 
agreements. Trade agreements are too important to subject to the will of a vocal minority of the 
Senate. Every recent President has considered TPA essential and Congress has agreed 
periodically.  
The rationale for TPA applies equally well to climate change. By speaking with one 
voice and providing a clear path to U.S. participation in international agreements, the United 
States secures more favorable terms. Global climate agreements are arguably more complex than 
trade agreements and require a similarly lengthy negotiation process. Multilateral climate 
agreements are difficult to conclude and even more difficult to renegotiate, in part because they 
involve more countries than do trade deals. The geopolitics of climate change are as challenging 
as the politics of international trade, and perhaps more so because the benefits of freer trade are 
more immediate than the benefits of mitigating emissions.  
With Climate Protection Authority, Congress would (i) authorize the President to 
negotiate new congressional–executive agreements, (ii) define U.S. negotiating objectives and 
principles, (iii) create mechanisms for improving coordination between both branches during 
these negotiations, and (iv) provide for a straight up-or-down vote in both houses of Congress on 
climate agreements within ninety days without conditions, holds, filibusters, or amendments. By 
enacting Climate Protection Authority as part of a Federal cap-and-trade bill, the United States 
could offer to make the U.S. emissions target more stringent, but only if other nations commit 
themselves to nationally appropriate and equitable climate action in a new global climate pact. 
This conditional offer would create a powerful incentive for other nations to make concessions to 
U.S. climate negotiators, thereby helping to protect U.S economic and foreign policy interests 
while reserving for Congress the final decision on whether a new agreement met the legislative 
conditions. (See Box 1)  
Climate Protection Authority may not be perfect, but the alternatives are worse. 
Continuing to treat climate deals as treaties makes little sense. Compared to congressional–
executive agreements, treaties are less democratic in that they disenfranchise a portion of the 
legislature; they are therefore less legitimate. Because treaties generally are not self-executing, 
implementing legislation is needed to give them effect. Implementing legislation requires the 
approval of the House; therefore, it makes sense to seek that body’s consent to join the 
international agreement in the first place. Treaties are cumbersome because Congress takes up 
approval of the international agreement and its implementing legislation separately and this often 
leads to delay. In contrast, with congressional–executive agreements Congress approves both 
simultaneously. The need for implementing legislation for treaties also creates the risk of a gap Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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between what the United States is required to do internationally under a treaty and what the 
Federal government actually does domestically under the implementing statute. The treaty 
process created by the framers of the Constitution requires an exceptional degree of national 
consensus that is no longer reasonable given the frequency and importance of international 
cooperation today. Further, unless Congress provides an alternative to the treaty form, Presidents 
may obligate the United States without congressional approval, relying on their authority to 
make sole and treaty–executive agreements. Although legally permissible, this approach would 
prove politically controversial, vulnerable to changes in political power, and a poor basis for a 
durable U.S. climate foreign policy. 
The President and Congress now have before them an important opportunity to pass 
legislation that creates Climate Protection Authority. A half dozen serious cap-and-trade bills are 
pending before Congress, and most climate policy experts predict that the United States will 
enact a cap-and-trade bill in the next few years. In the upcoming presidential election in 
November, each candidate supports cap-and-trade legislation and has declared it a top-tier 
priority.117  Each will have voted for similar legislation in the past.118  Recently, senior 
Republican Party strategists have suggested that President Bush would sign a cap-and-trade bill 
if it reached his desk before he leaves office, although that is not official policy.119  Any cap-and-
trade bill approved by Congress should serve as the framework statute for U.S. climate change 
foreign policy. It should stipulate that future climate agreements will be handled by the United 
States as congressional–executive agreements and create mechanisms for strengthening 
coordination between Congress and the President on international negotiations. In addition, the 
statutes should create streamlined TPA-style procedures to allow Congress to tighten the U.S. 
emissions cap if Congress approves an international climate agreement that obligates other 
nations to do their part to address the climate challenge. The next President should call on 
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Box 3: President’s First Climate Address 
Late January 2009 
My fellow Americans, climate change 
represents a grave threat to our country. Fighting 
this threat will be one of my top priorities as 
President. I will work with Congress to craft a 
genuinely bipartisan climate policy that protects our 
environment and economy. Because America must 
lead, I will ask Congress to enact legislation that 
reduces U.S. climate emissions X percent below 
today’s levels by 2020. And I will ask Congress to 
agree in advance that the United States will reduce 
its emissions by an additional Y percent if other 
major emitters commit to doing their fair share as 
well. To secure these commitments, I will also ask 
Congress for authority to negotiate new international 
agreements with other nations. In these negotiations, 
it will be vitally important for our nation to speak 
with one voice and for other nations to believe that 
we will uphold our end of the bargain. That is why I 
will ask Congress to approve “Climate Protection 
Authority” legislation, which will layout bipartisan 
negotiating goals and guarantee that new climate 
change agreements receive a fair and timely hearing 
in Congress. With the support of the American people 
and bipartisan cooperation in Congress, the United 
States can lead the international community, create 
good jobs at home, and protect the Earth’s climate 
system for future generations. 
Congress to enact Climate Protection Authority shortly after taking office. (An illustration of 
what the President might say on this topic shortly after the inaugural address is provided in Box 
3.). 
VI. Political Analysis 
In the final section of this paper, I examine possible reactions from Congress and show 
why Climate Protection Authority might help address the concerns of various stakeholders.  
A. Congressional Reactions 
The House of Representatives prefers congressional–executive agreements over treaties. 
After all, the House plays no formal role 
during the negotiation and approval of 
treaties, whereas its role in 
congressional–executive agreements is 
substantial and identical to that of the 
Senate—both houses must approve the 
measures by majority vote. With 
Democratic control of the House likely to 
increase in the next national election, the 
importance the House attaches to 
enacting Federal climate legislation will 
increase.  The willingness of the House 
to add Climate Protection Authority to a 
new cap-and-trade bill will depend on the 
attitudes of traditional Democratic Party 
stakeholders, including environmental 
and labor groups. The House, however, 
should have little philosophical 
opposition to Climate Protection 
Authority. 
The Senate has had a pragmatic 
view of congressional–executive 
agreements over the past few decades. A 
vocal minority in the Senate remains staunch defenders of the Senate’s remaining treaty Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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prerogatives; but as a whole, the Senate is usually willing to treat international agreements as 
executive agreements. The greatest obstacle to Senate concurrence may be the expectations 
created by the tendency (albeit inconsistent and not legally binding) of the President and the 
Senate to use the treaty form for certain types of agreements, including multilateral 
environmental accords.  
Why would the Senate set aside any expectations it may have regarding climate treaties? 
For one thing, Senate leaders may appreciate the geopolitical importance of U.S. participation in 
a new global climate pact. Like it or not, our refusal to join the Kyoto Protocol has become a 
symbol of American unilateralism and exceptionalism (our perceived believe the United States 
should not be bound by global norms). Perhaps few changes in U.S. foreign policy would more 
effectively demonstrate a renewed American commitment to multilateral cooperation.  
Interestingly, securing the Senate’s consent to Climate Protection Authority might only 
require a majority of the Senate. Assume that Climate Protection Authority is introduced as an 
amendment to a cap-and-trade bill on the Senate floor. Under the Senate’s rules, the amendment 
would be adopted by a simple majority vote. Securing the Senate’s approval of the cap-and-trade 
bill as a whole, of course, would require sixty votes (“cloture”) to avoid a filibuster. Arguably, 
few Senators would base their cloture vote on whether the cap-and-trade bill designated new 
international agreements as congressional–executive agreements. Most undecided Senators 
would vote based on how their constituents view the legislation, which would depend on the 
economic consequences of the cap-and-trade program in their home states. The inclusion of 
Climate Protection Authority in the bill would be unlikely to significantly alter that calculation. 
In other words, enacting Climate Protection Authority as a standalone statute would require sixty 
votes in the Senate (not far from the sixty-seven needed for a treaty), but doing so through a cap-
and-trade program would require only a majority of the Senators present and voting. 
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, with whom the Executive Branch would 
consult on matters of international agreement form, may be quite amenable to handling climate 
change agreements as congressional–executive agreements. Today’s Committee members are 
mostly internationalists who understand the benefits of U.S. participation in global agreements. 
The Committee could maintain its dominant role in managing the Senate’s review of 
international climate agreements by (i) defining the negotiating objectives for the United States; 
(ii) overseeing a formal Senate observer group to the negotiations; and (iii) seeking assurances 
for the Senate’s leadership that the Committee would manage the Senate’s review of any climate 
change congressional–executive agreements concluded by the President.  Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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B. Stakeholder Reactions 
Congress also will listen to the views of leading interest groups and stakeholders in the 
climate change policy debate. Most major stakeholders are focused on domestic climate 
legislation at present instead of international climate cooperation. They are likely to judge the 
recommendations in this paper based on how they might influence the substance and timing of a 
domestic cap-and-trade bill. Here are a few reasons why congressional–executive agreements 
and Climate Protection Authority could advance the interests of several key interest groups.  
Climate Protection Authority would give U.S. companies greater certainty about the 
future direction of U.S. international climate policy. U.S. negotiating objectives would be 
worked out with the Congress (not just with the executive branch) and would be enacted into 
law. Many of the largest U.S. multinational corporations, including members of the influential 
U.S. Climate Action Partnership,120 actively support a domestic cap-and-trade program. Many of 
these companies also support the proposition that the United States should join the next global 
climate change agreement. After the United States adopts mandatory emissions limits under 
domestic law, U.S. businesses will have an interest in any international agreement that can help 
create a level playing field around the world.  
Labor unions and businesses in energy-intensive sectors worry about how an 
international climate agreement might harm the competitiveness of U.S. companies and workers. 
Congressional–executive agreements and Climate Protection Authority would advance several of 
their core interests. For example, the legislation Congress adopts to authorize climate 
negotiations could instruct the President to negotiate robust compliance provisions that include 
both positive and negative incentives for other nations to take equitable climate action (such as 
border tax adjustments on goods coming from countries that are not taking appropriate climate 
action). Labor groups and energy-intensive industries have a special interest in seeing that other 
nations take on a legally binding international obligation to control their emissions. U.S. 
participation in an international agreement will be essential to securing legally binding 
commitments from other nations, including China and India. Moreover, Climate Protection 
Authority could direct the President to ensure that new climate agreements make any 
competitiveness provisions of U.S. climate laws less vulnerable to WTO challenge. WTO case 
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law shows that WTO dispute panels are less likely to rule against environmentally-oriented trade 
measures when those measures are authorized by a multilateral agreement. Also, Climate 
Protection Authority could make plain that Congress would reject any climate agreement that did 
not create a safe harbor for certain types of trade and competitiveness safeguards. In a treaty 
negotiation, in contrast, business and labor groups would have no guarantee that a President 
would attach a high priority to securing such provisions. I elaborate the competitiveness benefits 
of Climate Protection Authority in a forthcoming paper tentatively entitled Mind the Gap: The 
Competitiveness Benefits of Congressional–executive Agreements. 
Since congressional–executive agreements and Climate Protection Authority would 
improve the prospects of agreements that require action by all major emitters, including the 
United States, these ideas should resonate with the environmental community.  The United States 
would be more likely to join climate agreements negotiated pursuant to Climate Protection 
Authority. Environmentalists should also fine intriguing the proposition that climate agreements 
would receive the same “fast track” treatment that trade agreements have enjoyed on-and-off for 
decades.  
Conclusion 
After almost twenty years of negotiating climate change treaties under three different 
Presidents, the United States still lacks a strong bipartisan climate change foreign policy—one 
that articulates a compelling and credible vision of how the United States can engage the world 
to solve this major global threat. This continuing failure creates the serious risk that we will 
neither manage inevitable climate change nor avoid unmanageable climate disasters, or that we 
will do so without safeguarding the U.S. economy. In immediate terms, we run the dual risk that 
(i) the recently launched U.N. climate negotiations will produce a flawed agreement and (ii) the 
United States will fail to use new Federal climate change laws to engage other countries 
effectively on the environment or economic aspects of climate policy. 
The treaty practice of the United States is highly cumbersome and ill-suited for climate 
change. The odds are slim that the United States will join major new climate treaties because 
securing the constitutionally required two-thirds approval of the Senate would be exceptionally 
difficult for any economically significant agreement. Other nations understand this and are less 
willing to make the concessions we need to even have a chance of convincing the Senate.  In 
addition, the treaty approach does not do enough to promote cooperation between the President 
and Congress. Stronger coordination between the President and Congress is especially important 
for climate change given the depth and range of domestic interests, the need for implementing Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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legislation to give international agreements effect under domestic claw and the highly legislative 
nature of potential U.S. commitments. New approaches are needed. 
Instead of continuing down the treaty path, the United States should handle climate 
change agreements as we do trade deals, as executive agreements. Executive agreements carry 
the same force of law as treaties under international law and are equivalent to a Federal statute 
under domestic law. Unlike treaties, executive agreements are entered into either solely by the 
President based on previously delegated constitutional, treaty, or statutory authorities, or by the 
President and Congress together pursuant to a new statute. Though limits exist on the types of 
climate agreements the President could enter into without the approval of Congress, the 
President’s authorities are broader than many policymakers realize. The Clean Air Act, together 
with the President’s foreign affairs powers and the authority granted by the Senate’s approval of 
the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, arguably give the President wide 
latitude to conclude major climate change agreements, including ones that would entail 
substantial new economic costs. 
Although unilateral Presidential leadership may prove necessary if Congress refuses to 
act, it should be a last resort. Instead, the President should seek first to convince Congress to treat 
future climate change agreements as congressional–executive agreements, the routine form used 
for the vast majority of U.S. international agreements in hundreds of subject areas, including 
highly important and sometimes controversial issues. Congressional–executive agreements 
require the approval of a simple majority in both houses of Congress and are equivalent to 
treaties under international law. They have the force of law domestically too, trumping prior 
federal and state statutes.  
Specifically, Congress should enact legislation that would create Climate Protection 
Authority, which would define U.S. negotiating objectives, create mechanisms for coordination 
between the political branches of government, and require the President to submit concluded 
agreements to Congress for final approval using simplified procedures that ensure a timely and 
fair hearing. This approach should apply to the new global climate change agreement being 
negotiated in the United Nations and to other future arrangements with a smaller number of 
major emitting nations.  
Handling climate agreements as congressional–executive agreements and enacting 
Climate Protection Authority would speed the development of a genuinely bipartisan U.S. 
climate change foreign policy, improve coordination between the executive and legislative 
branches, strengthen the hand of U.S. climate negotiators to bring home good agreements that Resources for the Future  Purvis 
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protect both the environment and the economy, increase the prospects for U.S. participation in 
those agreements, protect the competitiveness of vulnerable economic sectors and energy 


















































*Reprinted from CRS, Treaties and Other Agreements, supra note 2. 
 